Talk Title: How to think about auctions
Abstract:
After discussing briefly the
contributions to thinking about auctions that come from operations research,
psychology, experimental economics, computer science and sociology, this talk
will discuss the limitations of game theory for helping with decisions related
to auctions. In particular, it will argue that decision theory dominates
game theory as a tool for bidders in sealed bid auctions and that decision
theory, broadly defined, also competes well with game
theory for helping make decisions related to the design of auctions.
(Game theorists are encouraged to attend and, if they so choose, to rebut these
arguments.)
The talk is intended for a wide audience. The
main part of it is based upon the attached paper, entitled “Decision
Analysis: The Right Tool for Auctions,” Decision Analysis 4(3),
pp. 167-172, 2007. The talk will also cover some material in Michael H.
Rothkopf and