Brown Bag Seminar - November 9, 2004
Speaker: Yves Crama
Affiliation: Management School, University of Liège, Belgium
Title: Control and voting power in corporate networks: Concepts and computational aspects
Time: 12:00 - 1:00 PM
Location: RUTCOR Building - Lounge, Rutgers University, Busch Campus,
Piscataway, NJ
Abstract: In this work, we propose to rely on power indices to measure
the amount of control held by individual shareholders in corporate networks. The
value of the indices is determined by a complex voting game viewed as the
composition of interlocked weighted majority games; the compound game reflects
the structure of shareholdings. We describe an integrated algorithmic approach
which allows to deal efficiently with the complexity of computing power indices
in shareholding networks, irrespective of their size or structure. In
particular, the approach explicitly accounts for the presence of float and of
cyclic shareholding relationships. It has been successfully applied to the
analysis of real--world financial networks.
This is joint work with Luc Leruth (IMF, Washington).
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